Territorial captivity and voter participation in national election: a theoretical and empirical analysis by Facchini, François & François, Abel
Territorial captivity and voter participation in national
election: a theoretical and empirical analysis
Franc¸ois Facchini, Abel Franc¸ois
To cite this version:
Franc¸ois Facchini, Abel Franc¸ois. Territorial captivity and voter participation in national elec-
tion: a theoretical and empirical analysis. Annual Meeting of the European of the European
Public Choice Society, 2005, Durham, United Kingdom. <hal-00270739>
HAL Id: hal-00270739
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00270739
Submitted on 7 Apr 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 	


ﬀﬁﬂﬃ
 !"
#$ﬂﬃ
 %&('))*,+-.)* 
/.* 
"01243ﬀ5! ﬂﬃ*7682ﬂﬃ9::;.1=<?>
 ﬂA@B0C=
D
ﬂE5
 
 
 
 
Territorial captivity and voter participation in national election: a 
theoretical and empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
François FACCHINI* and Abel FRANÇOIS* 
 
 
 
 
CES – University Paris 1 
Maison des Sciences Economiques 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital F75 647 Paris Cedex 13 
facchini@univ-paris1.fr ; abel@univ-paris1.fr 
  
 
Abstract: We propose a theory of territorial captivity to explain the level of voter turnout in 
national elections. We start by showing that the consequences of voting in an election are 
limited to a clearly defined territory. For this reason, the expected return on the election 
results will be higher for electors who have high exit costs. According to the theory of rational 
voting, the expected return on the election results influences the level of turnout. If this is so, 
then we can argue that the more “territorially captive” voters are, the more likely they are to 
vote. We continue by describing the institutional, geographical and property-related nature of 
captivity. By testing our hypothesis in the context of the French parliamentary elections of 
1997, we then demonstrate empirically that the constituencies in which individuals are most 
captive are also those with the highest turnout. 
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 1 Introduction 
 
The originality of this article lies in the introduction of a territorial dimension to the act 
of voting, from which we predict a certain number of consequences.  These consequences 
are then tested empirically.  
 
Our thesis is that voters who are least captive of the spatiality of their State are also the least 
likely to turn out to vote in national elections. Adopting a perspective based on the economic 
analysis of voter participation, we start with the idea that the more an individual’s future 
depends on political decisions, the more he will involve himself in those decisions. To put it 
another way: one of the determinants of the level of turnout proposed by the theory of 
rational voting is the expected return each voter associates with the election results and 
ensuing public decisions. We explore the differences between these individual returns, 
placing particular emphasis on the constraints weighing on them. 
If individuals can avoid the consequences of political decisions at little cost, then politics will 
hold less interest for them and they will abstain from voting. In this case, the absence of 
territorial captivity explains abstention. On the other hand, individuals’ captivity in relation to 
public decisions, in terms of wages or property, will increase their interest in political choices 
and encourage them to vote. We propose three forms of captivity: geographical, institutional 
and property-related. Our predicted connections between voter captivity and electoral 
behaviour are then verified by an econometric study of the French parliamentary elections of 
1997.  
 
The empirical study demonstrates that, once traditional determinants of participation have 
been controlled for, higher turnouts can be observed in those constituencies in which there 
are more home-owners, more public employees or more people in state-subsidised jobs. It 
also shows that constituencies with a higher proportion of people who commute daily to work 
in neighbouring countries have lower turnouts. The article is divided into four sections. In the 
first, we run briefly through the main principles of the rational theory of voting. In the second, 
we set out our argument for the influence of territorial captivity on voter turnout. The third 
section presents the econometric tests, and the final section explores the results of these 
tests, confirming our theoretical predictions for the French parliamentary elections of 1997. 
 
2. The economic analysis of voter participation 
 
Since the work of Downs (1957), the decision to vote has been represented as an 
economic calculation, taking into account the costs and advantages of the act of voting. The 
expected return on voting depends on four factors.  
  
pi= +
 
- The first element is the satisfaction the individual obtains by participating in the vote, quite 
independently of the election result (D). This satisfaction is derived from a simple taste for 
voting, a sense of civic duty (Riker and Odershook [1968], Jones and Hudson [2000]) or the 
opportunity to express one’s political and party preferences (Fiorina [1976] Brennan and 
Lomasky [1993], Jones and Hudson [2000]). 
- The second element, which reduces the return on voting, is the cost of participation (C): this 
may be the cost of the action of voting or the opportunity cost of the time devoted to making 
a decision (Tollison and Willet [1973]), notably in the acquisition of the information required to 
make the decision. 
The last two elements are connected with the election itself and with its result, and they are 
interdependent. 
- The third element is the rational individual’s probability of being the decisive voter among 
the whole of the voting population (  ), in other words the voter whose vote will win the day 
for - or prevent the defeat of - his preferred candidate. This probability influences the last 
element in the equation. 
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 - The last element is the utility the individual obtains from the result of the election (B) (Filer 
and Kenny [1980]). The expected utility of the election result is generally defined as the 
difference between the utility obtained from the implementation of the preferred candidate’s 
programme (c1) and that obtained from the implementation of the other candidate’s 
programme (c2). 
 
  

	 
	
= −
 
The candidates’ programmes are usually evaluated on the basis of their propositions 
concerning the most important themes in the campaign. As a general rule, as the theoretical 
developments of the public choice school have demonstrated that public decisions always 
have redistributive consequences, the candidates’ programmes can be evaluated in 
monetary - or at least economic - terms. 
 
In the theoretical and empirical analysis which follows, we aim to use the concept of captivity 
to explore the relation between voters’ turnout and their interest in the results of the election, 
i.e. in the public decisions implemented.  
 
3. Voter captivity and the act of voting 
 
The hypothesis developed in this article is an extension of the economic analysis of 
voter participation. It renders the concept of the expected utility of the election more precise 
by bringing into perspective the constraints which weigh on the voters’ choices 
 
3.1. Territory and decision 
 
The strongest constraint weighing on the individual’s decision to vote is territorial. 
Human action is necessarily located in space and time. Voters do not use absolute terms of 
reference to make their choices. They choose according to their geographical, institutional 
and property-related constraints. These constraints are not the result of choice. They are an 
expression of the relative captivity of an individual to his or her territory. Individuals are born 
into families, from which they inherit a legacy of property, culture, abilities and an attachment 
to territory, all of which increase their exit costs.  
 
The choice we are interested in here is the decision whether or not to vote. Voting is a 
political act. It designates the political entrepreneur who will control the State, defined by 
Hayek as the organisation of a territory under one government (Hayek [1983], 167). A 
territory “refers to an area of the earth delimited by abstract or physical borders which the 
individual cannot ignore” (Perrin [2001], 235, quoting Perroux [1991], 163). For these 
reasons, the consequences of voting are territorial. The expected utility of election results is 
delimited by the political borders defining the area in which the public decisions will be 
applied. We can call this the “spatiality” of the State.  
 
If the expected utility of the election results is limited to a certain territory and if each 
individual is more or less captive of his territory, then we can logically contend that a captive 
individual will be more motivated to vote in an election, because he knows that he will be 
directly affected, positively or negatively, by the resulting political decisions. The act of voting 
is thus dependent on the degree of captivity and/or attachment of the individual to his 
territory. An individual whose mobility costs are nil can always choose the spatiality of 
another State which suits him better, without ever participating in elections (voting with his 
feet).  
It is because individuals are constrained by their past choices (of location or career) or by the 
choices of their forebears (patrimony) that they are more or less interested in the potential or 
actual public decisions implemented in their territory.  
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3.2. Captivity and participation 
 
Having established this proposition, it remains for us to define more precisely the 
factors which make an individual more captive of his territory and de facto more concerned 
with election results.  
 
An individual is captive when his exit costs are prohibitive. This is the case if the capital he 
has inherited is not movable, or if his income derives from State aid or public employment. It 
is also the case if the costs (of moving or institutional costs) of going to live in a territory 
controlled by another State are high. We can therefore divide the factors of captivity into 
three main categories: geographical, property-related and institutional. 
 
Geographical captivity 
 
Individuals who live closest to the national borders of States can take advantage of 
institutional differences at little cost. Firstly, their information costs are lower than those of 
individuals living in zones further away from the border. This is because they have greater 
knowledge of tax laws, social laws, labour law, conditions of employment (wages), etc. 
Secondly, the learning and adaptation costs of individuals living near borders are lower 
because they have some knowledge of the institutions of the neighbouring country and they 
already reason to some extent in terms of these institutions. Thirdly, due to the relatively low 
costs of moving and transport, geographical closeness facilitates investment in both 
territories. 
 
For all these reasons, people living near borders are less captive of the spatiality of the State 
they live in – and therefore of election results - than those in the interior of the country. They 
are likely to be less interested in public decisions because they can always benefit from the 
advantages of different political orders at little cost. The expected utility of a public decision is 
therefore all the greater for voters who do not have this ability to take advantage, at little cost, 
of the economic opportunities to be found in a neighbouring territory.  
 
Property-related captivity 
 
Individuals possessing a sizeable patrimony are more interested in public decisions 
than individuals who have neither inherited nor built up any capital. This interest is even 
greater when their capital is immobile. The mobility of property depends partly on the nature 
of the goods possessed and partly on the regulatory and political controls on the movement 
of capital. Individuals whose property is in the form of real estate are thus more captive of 
political decisions, notably local ones, than those whose property is composed mainly of 
movable capital. 
 
Ultimately, the expected utility of a public policy is all the more important to an individual who 
has inherited or possesses a large capital which he considers would be relatively costly to 
delocalise. 
 
Institutional captivity 
 
Individuals can earn wages by working in the public sector, in the private sector 
and/or by working in subsidised employment. Agents who earn their living through 
commercial transactions are dependent on the decisions of consumers and of their 
employers. In this way, they are captive of the market and of the firms which organise 
production. On the contrary, agents employed in the public sector and/or receiving 
assistance from the State and other public administrative bodies (local government, social 
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 security and central State aid) are captive of the finance laws voted in Parliament by elected 
representatives.  
 
Out of two different candidates, two different individuals may both prefer the one who 
proposes an increase in public expenditure, but the first individual may obtain far greater 
utility from the implementation of this programme than the second. This could be the case if 
the first voter is a public employee, for whom an increase in public expenditure signifies a 
reduction in his workload or an increase in his pay, whereas the second voter prefers the 
same candidate for more sociotropic reasons.  
 
These differences in utility necessarily influence the decision to vote, and they are related to 
the institutional origin of the individuals’ incomes1 (market versus political order). A certain 
number of surveys, mainly empirical, have already demonstrated the higher levels of 
politicisation in general (Blais et al. [1997], Rouban [1998] and [2000]) and of election turnout 
in particular (Frey and Pommerehne [1982], Bennett and Orzechowski [1983], Jaarsma et al. 
[1986], Corey and Garand [2002]) among public employees.  
 
The expected utility of a public policy is therefore greater for individuals who are employed or 
assisted by the public authorities. 
 
3.3. Conclusions in the form of empirically testable predictions 
 
Using the theoretical developments presented above, we can propose a certain 
number of original observations which have not yet been studied by voting theorists. We can 
also demonstrate that citizens can make use of the institutional differences between States 
without “voting with their feet” (delocalising), without protest and without voting (abstention).  
Our overall prediction is that individuals are more likely to vote in an election when they are 
captive of the territory in which they live. Several more specific predictions can also be made 
concerning election turnout (table 1). 
 
Table 1: empirical predictions 
 
institutional geographical Origin of captivity State market national foreign property 
Predicted effect on 
voter participation + - + - + 
 
Thus, we can expect turnout to be higher among voters who derive their income from the 
political order, and lower among those who derive their income from the market order. 
Likewise, we can expect voters who earn their living abroad, either through trade or through 
cross-border commuting, to vote less in national elections than those who earn their living 
entirely within the territory. Lastly, we can expect voters possessing property to be more 
likely to vote than other voters, especially when their capital is immobile (real estate).  
Furthermore, the effects of these three sources of captivity can be cumulative. For example, 
French farmers possess highly immobile capital (land), and their income, which depends 
largely on political decisions - through the workings of the CAP -, derives mainly from France. 
We can therefore expect farmers to be highly motivated to participate in political decisions 
and notably in national elections. We shall test these predictions in the next section. 
1
 The issue here involves the source of voters’ wages, not the impact of wage levels on voter 
participation (Filer et al. [1993], Greene and Nikolaev [1999]), which is based on other arguments. 
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 4. Presentation of the empirical survey: the French parliamentary elections of 1997 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on an econometric study of the determinants of voter turnout 
in the French parliamentary elections of 1997. 
 
4.1. Description of the data and dependent variable 
 
We have chosen to work on these elections because of the availability of data. These 
are the national (not local) elections which are the closest in time to the national census of 
1998/1999. This census was the first for which results were published at the level of electoral 
constituencies, providing new opportunities for empirical work2. In addition, it is impossible to 
conduct a study of several different elections, because the other available census data are 
too far off in time and/or use geographical definitions other than electoral constituencies. 
 
We set out to explain the level of turnout, defined as the number of votes cast in proportion to 
the number of registered voters, in the constituencies in the second round of the elections. 
We have preferred to study the second round rather than the first so as not to complicate the 
explanation of turnout with considerations connected with the political components present in 
each constituency3. French parliamentary elections take the form of a uninominal majority 
voting system with two rounds. If no candidate gains an outright majority in the first round, 
then all the candidates who have obtained more than 12.5% take part in a second round. In 
the second round, the candidate who obtains the relative majority is elected.  
 
Table 2: Turnout in the second round of the 1997 parliamentary elections  
(531 constituencies) 
 mean s.d. min max 
Turnout 71.73 4.36 55.29 84.9 
 
Out of the 577 existing parliamentary constituencies, we have excluded the 22 
constituencies corresponding to overseas territories and the 4 constituencies in Corsica, 
because of their socio-economic and political specificities. Another 7 constituencies are 
excluded because they had no second round, as one of the candidates won an absolute 
majority in the first round. Finally, we have also excluded those constituencies in which only 
one candidate was present in the second round4. Consequently, our sample is comprised of 
531 constituencies, in which two or three candidates faced each other. 
 
In these 531 constituencies, each containing an average of 68,840 voters, the average 
turnout, as a percentage of registered voters, was 72%, with a minimum of 55% and a 
maximum of 85% (table 1). 
 
4.2. Measurements of property-related and institutional captivity 
 
Two variables are used to evaluate institutional captivity. The first is the percentage of 
public employees in the active population of the constituency (PubEmp); the second is the 
percentage of state-subsidised employees5 in the active population (SubEmp). These two 
categories are the most exposed, in terms of wages, to modifications in public policy. 
2
 As there is no yearly update of this census at a constituency level, we assume that the differences 
observed between constituencies are stable between 1997 and 1999. 
3
 For an economic analysis of voter participation in the first round of these elections, see Fauvelle-
Aymar and François [2004], and François [2003]. 
4
 This situation arises when two candidates from the same coalition have obtained enough votes to go 
through to the second round, and the candidate in second place has respected the coalition 
agreement to withdraw in favour of the other. 
5
 The category of subsidised job corresponds to a specific contract offered by public administration or 
non-profit organizations for the long-term unemployed.  
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 Consequently, we expect constituencies containing a higher percentage of these two 
categories to have a higher turnout.  
 
Table 3: Income source and patrimony 
 mean s.d. min-max 
public employee (% of AP) 17.43 3.74 6.75 – 30.05 
subsidized job (% of AP) 2.24 0.93 0.47 – 5.72 
home owner (% of households) 55.74 12.01 19.84 – 78.87 
 
We obtain an approximate estimation of the possession of immobile property through 
the percentage of home-owners in the constituency (Owners), and, ceteris paribus, we 
expect the possession of real estate to encourage voter participation.  
 
Because of its specificity (in terms of the institutional, geographical and property-related 
source of income) we have included the category of farmers, which is, a priori, the most 
captive socio-professional category in terms of our three criteria. Thus, the variable Farmers 
indicates the percentage of the active population working in farming. On average, 3.02% of 
the active population works in this sector, with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 18.42%. 
Logically, we would expect a high proportion of farmers to increase turnout in a constituency. 
 
4.3. Measurement of geographical captivity 
 
To measure the effect of territorial captivity on voter participation, we have 
distinguished between the constituencies possessing none, one or two geographical borders6 
with neighbouring European countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy 
and Spain)7. Thus, 12% of the constituencies in our sample have at least one border (table 
3). We can see that on average, the level of turnout (simple or weighted by the size of the 
population of the constituency) is higher in constituencies with no border. 
 
Table 4 : Turnout in the constituencies with borders 
 frequency turnout(a) commuting(a) 
no borders 466 87.76 % 
71.97 
72.17 
3.65 
3.59 
1 border 59 11.11 % 
70.50 
70.41 
7.32 
7.54 
2 borders 6 1.13 % 
65.35 
65.26 
23.75 
24.31 
overall 531 100% 
71.73 
71.90 
4.29 
4.28 
(a): the first line in the "turnout" and "commuting" columns gives the simple mean of 
turnout, the second line gives the weighted mean (by population size) 
 
However, these constituencies sustain more or less well-developed economic relations with 
their neighbouring countries, notably due to the fact that political borders are sometimes 
drawn along the lines of physical frontiers that hinder exchange. In these border 
constituencies, we have therefore taken into account the percentage of the active population 
that commutes to work outside the administrative region8. Thus, in constituencies with no 
borders, 3.65 % of the active, working population commute outside the region, compared 
6
 The list of these constituencies can be obtained by e-mail, on request (abel@univ-paris1.fr). 
7
 As we have already excluded overseas territories from our sample, borders with non-European 
countries are not taken into account. 
8
 This is not the precise percentage of the population working abroad but an approximation, based on 
the assumption that in border constituencies most of the people working outside the region actually 
work abroad.  
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 with twice as many (7.32%) in constituencies with one border and six times as many 
(23.75%) in constituencies with two borders. 
For constituencies with no borders, the variable measuring the effect of territorial captivity on 
turnout (Mig x Border) takes the value of zero. For constituencies with one or two borders, it 
takes the value of the percentage of the active population commuting to work outside the 
region. 
 
4.3. Other factors influencing turnout: the control variables  
 
The first factor which must be controlled for, by including the variable Unemp9, is the 
impact of unemployment on turnout in constituencies.  
 
There are several reasons why this is important. Firstly, some of the French regions 
bordering other countries are currently going through a period of industrial restructuring 
(Nord-Pas de Calais, Ardennes, Lorraine, Franche-Comté). They consequently display 
demographic or economic specificities, which have widely recognised effects on election 
turnout. For example, these zones have a high level of state-subsidised employment, the 
beneficiaries of which are naturally very interested in election results. Equally, these regions 
suffer from relatively high levels of unemployment, which has a negative impact on voter 
participation. It is therefore necessary to control for the effect of these specificities on turnout, 
both to evaluate correctly the impact of territorial captivity on turnout and to avoid any bias 
from the omission of variables. Secondly, there may be colinearity between this variable and 
the other economic variables, notably Farmers, SubEmp and PubEmp10. By comparing a first 
regression carried out using all the variables (regression a) and a second regression in which 
the rate of unemployment is excluded (regression b), we can demonstrate that any potential 
multicolinearity has no effect on the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients. 
 
The other variables11 can be divided into two sets. The first set comprises factors connected 
with the election campaign; the second groups together the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the constituency. 
 
Firstly, campaign expenditure enables us to take into account the intensity of the candidates’ 
commitment to the electoral competition. After several tests, and following both theoretical 
postulates and the results of previous empirical studies (Fauvelle-Aymar and François 
[2005]), we have chosen to use the total spending of candidates per registered voter 
(SpendRV) in the form of a third degree polynomial. The effect of candidates’ spending 
should be positive but the marginal return should decrease. 
 
Secondly, we integrate the Downsian closeness hypothesis (Downs [1957]) into our model, 
in other words the impact of the expected closeness of the result on individuals’ decisions 
whether or not to vote. As we are studying the second round, we quantify the margin 
between the leading candidate and the second-placed candidate in the first round of the 
elections, which took place a week earlier (Marge)12. According to the literature (Fauvelle-
Aymar and François [2005]), the smaller this margin is in the first round, the higher the 
turnout is in the second round. Theoretically, the sign of this coefficient is therefore negative. 
Thirdly, the variable ThreeCand controls for the composition of the choice of candidates in 
the second round, as it takes the value 1 when there are three candidates and 0 when there 
9
 Defined by the share of the active population without a job. 
10
 The matrix of coefficients of correlation is given in appendix 2. 
11
 Appendix 1 presents the statistical characteristics of the variables. 
12
 The precise definition chosen takes into account the multi-party nature of the election, and is 
expressed by 
 
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 are only two candidates. As the presence of a third candidate increases the political choice 
available, we can expect it to have a positive effect on turnout (François [2003]). 
 
As for the demography of the constituencies, we have taken into account the proportion of 
women in the total population (Women), and the proportion of 18 to 20 year-olds 
(PopAge1820) and over-60’s in the total population (PopAge>60), given that there is a lower 
turnout among these two age groups. 
 
Finally, the relation to be calculated is the following: 
 
  



    
	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5. Results of the estimations 
 
The results of the two estimations are presented in table 3. It appears that the quality 
of the estimations is satisfactory, as the two R² exceed 60%. The variables expressing the 
impact of the election campaign on turnout have the expected effects. Thus, campaign 
expenditure has a decreasing marginal return in terms of voter mobilisation, while the 
presence of a third candidate (ThreeCand) and the expectation of a close result (Marge) 
have a positive influence on turnout. 
 
As for the socio-demographic factors, the category (Women) has no significant effect on 
turnout, whereas the proportions of the two age groups (PopAge1820 and PopAge>60) have 
a negative influence when they are significant (i.e. in 3 cases out of 4). 
 
The variables used to measure the effect of captivity on turnout are all significant and have 
the expected sign. Firstly, constituencies with a higher proportion of home-owners (Owners) 
have higher turnout, confirming the impact of patrimonial captivity. Secondly, constituencies 
in which a high proportion of the active population is in public employment (PubEmp) or 
state-subsidised employment (SubEmp) also have a higher turnout. This appears to confirm 
the effect of institutional captivity. Thirdly, daily commuting to work in neighbouring countries 
(Mig x border) has a negative and strongly significant effect, whether or not the rate of 
unemployment is controlled for. Thus, an increase of one percent in the share of the active 
population working abroad in constituencies with at least one national border leads to a 0.1 
percent reduction in turnout. The empirical analysis thus appears to validate our predictions 
concerning the influence of territoriality on the decision whether or not to vote. 
 
These results for the control variables are confirmed both with and without taking into 
account the variable representing the rate of unemployment (regressions (a) and (b)). Even if 
there is some multicolinearity, this does not change the sign, significance or scale of the 
effects of the other variables. In addition, the effect of cross-border commuting cannot be 
explained by the neglected impact of the rate of unemployment, which further strengthens 
the robustness of our conclusions. 
 
Finally, agricultural constituencies (Farmers), which accumulate positive turnout effects from 
all three forms of captivity, display a much higher rate of turnout than other constituencies. In 
any given constituency, the higher the proportion of the active population working in the 
farming sector, the higher the turnout in national elections. 
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Table 5: Estimation of turnout (OLS) 
dependent variable: 
turnout 
  
 (a) (b) 
independent variables 
coefficient 
student t 
coefficient 
student t 
SpendRV  1.336 *** 
 2.55 
 1.712 *** 
 3.44 
SpendRV² -0.078 ** 
-2.38 
-0.101 *** 
-3.29 
SpendRV3  0.001 ** 
 2.24 
 0.002 *** 
 3.10 
ThreeCand  1.817 *** 
 6.25 
 1.438 *** 
 4.98 
Marge -11.707 *** 
-5.54 
-0.105 *** 
-4.82 
Women -0.248 
-1.46 
-0.070 
-0.39 
PopAge1820 -0.391 ** 
-2.19 
-0.400 ** 
-2.13 
PopAge>60 -0.075 
-1.25 
-0.150 ** 
-2.40 
Farmers  0.323 *** 
 3.79 
 0.534 *** 
 6.35 
Owners  0.119 *** 
 6.42 
 0.166 *** 
 9.01 
PubEmp  0.104 ** 
 2.67 
 0.135 *** 
 3.29 
SubEmp  2.075 *** 
 8.77 
 0.871 *** 
 5.16 
Unemp -0.385 *** 
-6.92 - 
Mig x border -0.146 *** 
-6.86 
-0.119 *** 
-5.70 
Intercept  73.42 *** 
 8.05 
 58.46 *** 
 6.28 
 F(14,516) = 67.36 
R² adj. : 0.63 
N = 531 
F(13,517) = 62.48 
R² adj. : 0.60 
N = 531 
Estimation with ordinary least squares 
The t-ratios are corrected by the method of White (1980). 
*** means that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This article has demonstrated the effect of territorial captivity on the decision whether to vote 
in national elections. It provides new insight into existing interpretations of the influence on 
turnout of patrimony and sources of income and adds a geographical dimension that has 
until now been overlooked. It could be extended through a deepening of the theory of 
captivity and through further empirical tests on local and European elections. 
- It is likely that European elections mobilise the voters who are most captive of EU 
decisions, in other words border-dwellers, farmers, inhabitants of disadvantaged 
zones receiving European structural funds and the owners of movable capital. 
- At a local level,  it is also likely that property-related captivity plays a very important 
role both in turnout and in political involvement, as the value of real estate is very 
dependent on decisions concerning zoning and local government infrastructures. 
 
 
Appendix 1: Description of variables  
 
 Mean Standard deviation Min – Max 
Particip 71.73 4.36 55.29 – 84.9 
SpendRV 12.66 3.68 5.66 – 31.71 
ThreeCand 0.15 0.35 0 – 1 
Marge 8.25 6.68 0 – 30.3 
Women 52.25 1.22 49.92 – 57.00 
Popage1820 5.18 1.02 2.78 – 9.05 
Popage>60 21.70 4.94 8.60 – 35.79 
Farmers 3.02 3.37 0 – 18.42 
Owners 55.74 12.01 19.84 – 78.87 
Mig x boundary 1.09 4.49 0 – 37.76 
PubEmp 17.43 3.74 6.75 – 30.05 
SubEmp 2.24 0.93 0.47 – 5.72 
Unemp 12.84 3.91 5.99 – 36.73 
 
 
Appendix 2: Partial coefficients of correlation 
 
 Unemp Farmers Owners PubEmp SubEmp MigxBorder 
Unemp  1      
Farmers -0.24 ***  1     
Owners -0.37 ***  0.59 ***  1    
PubEmp  0.66 ***  0.28 ***  0.13 ***  1   
SubEmp  0.23 *** -0.35 *** -0.32 ***  0.12 ***  1  
MigxBorder -0.11 ** -0.11 **  0.04 -0.09 ** -0.23 ***  1 
*** means that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level and * at the 10 percent level. 
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